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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
CaseNo.2007-0962-CA

Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
ERNEST JOHN YOUNG, aka
JASON PRESSLEY,
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(j).

QUESTION PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Whether Young's guilty pleas were knowing and voluntary? This Court reviews
"a trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea under an abuse of discretion
standard, incorporating the clearly erroneous standard for the trial court's findings of fact
made in conjunction with that decision." State v. Holland, 921 P.2d 430,433 (Utah 1996).
"However, the ultimate question of whether the trial court strictly complied with . . .
procedural requirements for entry of a guilty plea is a question of law that is reviewed for
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correctness." Id. This issue was preserved in Mr. Young's motion to withdraw guilty plea,
and at a hearing on the motion held November 1, 2007. (R. 375 & 382).

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
All relevant statutory and constitutional provisions are set forth in the Addenda.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
Ernest Young appeals from the judgment, sentence, and conviction of the Foruth

District Court entered after the court denied his motions to withdraw his guilty plea.
B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition
Ernest Young was charged by Information filed in Third District Court and

transferred to the Fourth District Court on May 26, 2006 with two counts of Influencing
Retaliating or Threatening a Judge, both Third Degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code
Annotated § 76-8-316 (R. 4). The charges arose from defendant making phone calls on
May 5, 2006 to judges of the Third District making various threats. The threats were left
on the court's voicemail system. (Pre-Sentence Report, R. 348).
On July 14, 2007 the state filed a Petition to Inquire into Defendant's Competency
was filed. (R. 55). The alienists filed reports with the court recommending a finding that
the defendant was not competent to proceed. Defendant objected to such a finding and
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requested a hearing. The formal competency hearing was held on October 26, 2006. Dr.
Wootton and Dr. Nielson testified and recommended that defendant be found not
competent to proceed. At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Stott found the defendant
not competent and remanded him to the custody of the Utah State Mental Hospital for
treatment. (R. 182, 184 & 191). Defendant attempted to pursue and Interlocutory Appeal
of this ruling. On December 21, 2006 The Utah Court of Appeals denied the
Interlocutory Appeal. (R. 245).
Several Competency Review hearings were held. On May 31, 2007 the court
determined that defendant was competent to stand trial and a Preliminary Hearing was
scheduled for June 14, 2007. (R. 344).
On June 14, 2007, while being represented by Mr. David Stewart, a Preliminary
Hearing was waived before Judge Stott. Mr. Young executed a Statement of Defendant
in Support of Guilty Plea and Young entered a guilty plea to Count One. Count Two was
dismissed. (R. 357). Exhibit C
Sentencing was scheduled for Mr. Young on July 26, 2007. Prior to sentencing Mr.
Young advised his counsel and the court that he wanted to withdraw his guilty plea. Mr.
Stewart filed a Withdrawal of Counsel. (R. 363).
On September 20, 2007 a Motion to Withdraw his guilty plea was filed on behalf
of Defendant. (R. 375). The basis for the motion was as follows: One, Ineffective
Counsel. Two, defendant's allegation that he did not fully understand his rights and the
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consequences of entering the plea. Three, that the court failed to strictly comply with
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The hearing on the Motion to Withdraw the Plea was held on November 1, 2007.
At the close of the hearing, the trial court denied the motion, concluding that, "I read the
material that both sides have filed. I believe based upon all of that information, that the
defendant's rights with respect to Rule 11 have been complied with. I believe that
considering the discussions had on the record, and the statement in support of plea, that
the rule requirements and the case law requirements with respect to insuring that the
defendant knows of his rights and understands the consequences of his decision to plead
guilty have been satisfied, and that the plea was freely, voluntarily, and knowingly given.
With that, what to you wan to do with respect to sentencing now?" (Transcript of hearing
held 11/1/07 pg. 3).
On December 3, 2007 counsel for Mr. Young filed a Notice of Appeal in Fourth
District Court (R. not in appeal record, held in purple file at 4 District Court).
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
A. Facts from Entry of Plea on June 14, 2007.
At the Entry of Plea hearing the trial court asked Mr. Young's counsel, David
Stewart, if he believed Mr. Young understood the information in the Statement in
Advance of Plea as to his constitutional rights he is giving up and the potential sentence.
Mr. Stewart said yes and then the court asked Mr. Young if he agreed to which he replied
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that he did. (Transcript of hearing held 6/14/07 pg. 3). The court asked Mr. Young if he
understood that he was giving up his constitutional rights as set forth in the document and
that he would have no further grounds to contest the charges. To which Mr. Young stated,
"That's correct, the file's not going to get any bigger your honor." (Transcript of hearing
held 11/1/07 pg. 3). The court stated that it is not how big the file is going to get but,
"The ultimate question is when does the case get resolved." Mr. Young was given the
opportunity to ask any more questions and the only question he had was about the case
being transferred to Mental Health Court as a condition of the sentence. When the plea
was entered counsel for the state, counsel for the defendant and the defendant were
seeking to have the sentence imposed include as a condition of probation that Mr. Young
would enter into and complete mental health court. (Transcript of hearing held 11/1/07
pg. 4). The court was clear that the sentence to be imposed was up to the court and
although the court would consider input a term in the Utah State Prison could be imposed.
(Transcript of hearing held 11/1/07 pg. 5). The court did not make any independent
inquiry into the defendant's understanding of just what his constitutional rights were or
what the term "constitutional rights" meant to him. No factual basis for the charges was
stated on the record.
C. Facts from Hearing on Motion to Withdraw Pleas on November 1,2007.
At the hearing on Young's Motion to Withdraw his Plea he was represented by
Brook Sessions (R. 402). At the hearing counsel submitted the issue of withdrawing the
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plea on the pleadings. The Memorandum in Support of Motion to Withdraw Plea
attached as Exhibit 1. (Transcript of hearing held 11/1/07 pg. 3).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant demanded counsel file an appeal in this case. Defendant argues that
the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
Defendant believes his plea was not made knowingly or voluntarily. At the time the plea
was entered he was suffering from a serious psychological condition, which caused him
be unable to fully understand his rights and the consequences of his plea. Defendant
spent over five hundred days in custody prior to sentencing. A majority of that time was
at the Utah State Mental Hospital. Even when Mr. Young was finally found competent it
was clear that he still did and does to this day believe that he is the biological son of Elvis
Pressley. Mr. Young believes that he is in fact Jason Pressley. The only way the alienist
was able to assert competency was to state that Mr. Young improved enough to
compartmentalize in his mind whom he is and yet while under this misperception can
meaningfully participate and understand the proceedings against him. (R. 337 Report
from state mental hospital Dr. Spencer.) (Exhibit B).
Mr. Young asserts that he was not informed of all of his constitutional rights either
by the court at the entry of plea hearing or by his counsel prior to the hearing. Mr. Young
asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to inform him of his rights in terms
he could understand. As a result, because his trial counsel was ineffective, his guilty plea
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was not made knowingly or voluntarily and this court should reverse the trial court's
denial of his motion to withdraw that plea. Defendant is upset that he was sentenced to
prison rather than put on probation and into mental health court. Defendant is in need of
further mental health treatment to address his ability to understand these proceedings and
the requirements of our society.

ARGUMENT
YOUNG'S GUILTY PLEA WAS UNKNOWING AND
INVOLUNTARY BECAUSE HIS TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE AND
THE COURT FAILED TO STRICTLY COMPLY WITH RULE 11
Utah Code Annotated § 77-13-6(2)(a) states that "A plea of guilty... may be
withdrawn only upon leave of the court and a showing that it was not knowingly and
voluntarily made." Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure governs the entry of
pleas in criminal matters. Rule 11(e)(2) requires that all pleas be entered "voluntarily".
"Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial courts the burden of ensuring that constitutional and
Rule 11(e) requirements are complied with when a guilty plea is entered." State v.
Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987). This burden "demands the utmost solicitude
of which courts are capable in canvassing the matter with the accused to make sure he has
a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequences.'" Gibbons, 740
R2d at 1312 (quoting Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1712-13
(1969)). The trial court must strictly adhere to Rule 11(e). See State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d

371, 372 (Utah 1996).
This Court reviews "a trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea
under an abuse of discretion standard, incorporating the clearly erroneous standard for the
trial court's findings of fact made in conjunction with that decision." State v. Holland, 921
P.2d 430, 433 (Utah 1996). "However, the ultimate question of whether the trial court
strictly complied with . . . procedural requirements for entry of a guilty plea is a question
of law that is reviewed for correctness." Id.
A guilty plea cannot be voluntary if it is uniformed. State v. Breckenridge, 688
R2d 440, 443-44 (Utah 1983). Moreover, a trial court '"personally establish that the
defendant's guilty plea is truly knowing and voluntary and establish on the record that the
defendant knowingly waived his or her constitutional rights and understood the elements
of the crime.' State v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1993); see also State v. Maguire,
830 P.2d 216, 217-18 (Utah 1991); State v. Hoff, 814 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Utah 1991).
Finally, in addition to confirming that the defendant understands the elements of the
crime, the trial court must determine that the defendant 'possesses an understanding of the
law in relation to the facts' for the defendant's plea to be 'truly voluntary.' State v.
Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440, 444 (Utah 1983) (quoting McCarthy v. United States, 394
U.S. 459, 466, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 1171, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969))." Thurrnan, 911 P.2dat 373.
Even where the trial court complies with the requirements of Rule 11, "The
ineffectiveness of counsel that contributes to a flawed guilty plea, however, can spare a
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defendant the consequences of her plea only if the defendant makes out the same case
required of every defendant who seeks to withdraw a plea: that the plea was not knowing
and voluntary. See State v. West, 765 P.2d 891, 896 (Utah 1988) (remanding the case to
determine whether the defendant's original plea was knowing and voluntary where the
facts suggest that the defendant "received nothing in return for his guilty plea" and
"apparently received seriously deficient information from all persons involved in his
case"). State v. Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, ^ 13, 167 P.3d 1046. In addressing
ineffectiveness claims in regards to the entry of guilty pleas, the Stricklandtest applies.
See State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12,116, 26 P.3d 203 (following Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S.
52, 58, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985), which stated that "the two-part Strickland
v. Washington test applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of
counsel"). See also State v. Rojas-Martinez, 2005 UT 86, ^ 10, 125 P.3d 930.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Young asks that this Court reverse the trial court's denial of his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea and that this matter be remanded to the Fourth District Court
with instructions that his plea is to be withdrawn. Alternatively, he requests that the
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matter be remanded to the Fourth District Court with instructions that a hearing should be
held on his second motion to withdraw his plea.

SUBMITTED this 2nd day of July, 2008.

BROOK SESSIONS
Counsel for Appellant
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EXHIBIT A
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Withdraw Plea.

BROOK SESSIONS (6136)
HARRIS & CARTER
Attorney for Defendant
3325 N. University Ave., Ste. 200
Jamestown Square, Clocktower Bldg.
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 375-9801
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
—oooOooo—
STATE OF UTAH,
)
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
Plaintiff,
) OF MOTION TO WITHDRAW
vs.
) PLEA
ERNEST JOHN YOUNG,
Aka Jason Presley
Defendant.

)
)
)

CR.No. 061402072

OoOoo
Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Plea, is pending before this court. The
following Memorandum in Support of Motion to Withdraw Plea is hereby
submitted after review of the audio of the proceedings before Judge Gary D. Stott
on June 14, 2007:
1.

Defendant's motion is based on U.C.A. §77-13-6, 1953 as amended.

2.

Defendant's plea was tendered June 14, 2007. Sentencing has not been
imposed.

3.

The defendant contends that under the Sixth Amendment of the United
States Constitution, the defendant is entitled to effective counsel on
cases in which jail or prison may be imposed. Assumed in that right is
the right to effective counsel. Defendant contends that his counsel did
not adequately advise him of the rights he was giving up by entering a
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guilty plea or the potential consequences of entering a guilty plea in
these cases.
4.

Defendant contends that he did not fully understand all aspects of
entering a plea and giving up his constitutional rights.

5.

The right to counsel is found in The United States Constitution and in
The Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 12 that provides an
independent right of counsel. It is further granted pursuant to statute.
U.C.A. 77-1-6(1 )(a). The defendant submits that a conviction obtained
where ineffective counsel is present does not meet the requirements of
the constitutions and of statute.

6.

The United States Supreme Court has held that the defendant's right to
rely on counsel as a medium between the defendant and the State
attaches upon the initiation of the formal charges. Michigan v. Harvey,
494 U.S. 344 (1990.)

The right attaches even in misdemeanor cases,

wherein a deprivation of liberty may ensue, and more so in a felony case.
State v. Vincent, 845 P2d. 254 (Utah App. 1992). Argersinger v.
Hamlin. 407 U.S. 25 (1972). Webster v. Jones. 587 P2d. 528 (Utah
1978). State v.Vincent 845 P2d. 254 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

VIOLATIONS OF RULE ELEVEN
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure speaks to this issue of the right
to counsel. It requires that counsel shall represent an accused, unless the defendant
waives counsel in open court.

The defendant cannot even be required to plead

until he/she has had adequate time to confer with counsel. Rule 11(a).

See also

McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 173, 104 S. Ct 944, 79 L.Ed 2d 122 (1984);
also OremCitvv. Bergstrorq 992 P.2d 991, 993-994 (Utah 1999).
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In State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 914 (Utah 1998), the Utah Supreme
Court advised: The right to have the assistance of counsel in a criminal trial is a
fundamental
Constitutional right, which must be jealously protected by the trial court.
The United States Supreme Court has stated:
The Constitutional right of an accused to be represented by counsel
invokes, of itself, the protection of a trial court, in which the
accused—whose life or liberty is at stake—is without counsel. The
protecting duty imposes the serious and weighty responsibility upon
the trial judge of determining whether there is an intelligent and
competent waiver by the accused. Johnson, 304 U.S. at 465, 58 S.
CI 1019.
See also Strong v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 294, 452 P.2d 323 (1969) and State
v. Smith, 776P.2d 929 (Utah 1989).
When taking a defendant's plea the court must strictly comply with Rule
Eleven of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309
(Utah 1987). Rule Eleven provides in relevant part:
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has
knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel;
(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of
innocence, the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the
right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the right
to confront and cross-examine in open court the prosecution
witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived;
(4) (A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the
offense to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the
prosecution would have the burden of proving each of those
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an
admission of all those elements;
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is
sufficient if it establishes that the charged crime was actually
committed by the defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is
otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution has
sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction;
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(5) t h e defendant knows t h e minimum and maximum s e n t e n c e , and i f
a p p l i c a b l e , t h e minimum mandatory n a t u r e of t h e minimum s e n t e n c e ,
t h a t may be imposed for each offense t o which a p l e a i s e n t e r e d ,
i n c l u d i n g t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of t h e i m p o s i t i o n of c o n s e c u t i v e
sentences;
(6) i f t h e t e n d e r e d p l e a i s a r e s u l t of a p r i o r p l e a d i s c u s s i o n
and p l e a agreement, and i f s o , what agreement has been reached;
(7) t h e defendant has been a d v i s e d of t h e time l i m i t s for
any motion t o withdraw t h e p l e a ; and

filing

(8) t h e defendant has been a d v i s e d t h a t t h e r i g h t of appeal i s
limited.
These f i n d i n g s may be based on q u e s t i o n i n g of t h e defendant on
the
r e c o r d o r , i f used, a w r i t t e n s t a t e m e n t r e c i t i n g t h e s e f a c t o r s
a f t e r the
c o u r t has e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t t h e defendant has r e a d , u n d e r s t o o d , and
acknowledged t h e c o n t e n t s of t h e s t a t e m e n t . If the defendant
cannot u n d e r s t a n d t h e E n g l i s h language, i t w i l l be s u f f i c i e n t t h a t
t h e s t a t e m e n t has been read or t r a n s l a t e d t o t h e d e f e n d a n t .
Unless s p e c i f i c a l l y r e q u i r e d by s t a t u t e or r u l e , a c o u r t i s not
r e q u i r e d t o i n q u i r e i n t o or a d v i s e concerning any c o l l a t e r a l
consequences of a p l e a .

At the hearing on June 14, 2007 when the Defendant entered his plea the
court engaged Mr. Young in a colloquy. Defendant submits that the colloquy did
not strictly comply with Rule 11. Defendant was not advised that the maximum
fine, which could be imposed of $5,000.00 on the third degree felony. He was not
advised that thefinewould include the 85% surcharge. Defendant was not advised
that a court security fee could be imposed. Failure to do so makes the plea
involuntary. State v. Thurmaa 911 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah 1996).
Defendant was not formally advised of his right to counsel. Although
counsel was appointed and present with the Defendant, Mr. Young maintains that
his attorney did not effectively represent him and that Mr. Young should have been
advised of his right to counsel.
Mr. Young was not advised of his right to compel and confront witnesses.
He was not specifically questioned about his understanding of his rights to require
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the state to prove each and every element of the offenses against him. In fact, no
factual basis for the plea was stated on the record.
Mr. Young was not advised that by entering a plea he was giving up his
right to an appeal. He was not told that by entering a plea he was limiting his
appeal rights to only appealing the entry of the plea and the sentence that might be
imposed.
Mr. Young was not questioned to determine if he was under the influence of
drugs or alcohol or suffering from a mental condition that precluded him from
understanding the proceedings. In this case Mr. Young's mental condition is very
relevant. Mr. Young believed at the time of the offense and still believes that his
birth father is Elvis Pressley. Mr. Young believes his true name is Jason Pressley
and that the world is involved in a conspiracy to prevent him from claiming all that
he is due as a result of being the biological son of Elvis Pressley. Mr. Young has
been found competent to proceed. This doesn't mean that he understands the
proceedings against him. Mr. Young believes he is innocent and doesn't believe
that the court should rely on his guilty plea to convict him.
Mr. Young's plea was not voluntarily given and he should be allowed to
withdraw the plea. State v. Thurmaa 911 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah 1996). Counsel has
advised Mr. Young that a withdrawal of the plea is not a dismissal. Mr. Young
understands that he will have to defend against each count individually. He believes
it is in his best interest to do so because he believes that when he presents the
evidence of his true identity the court will understand why he behaved as he did.
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WHEREFORE, Defendant respectfully requests that he be allowed to
withdraw his plea and that his case move forward to a jury trial.

DATED this //

//

day of
of ,N
StfH'^OZ,
day
yp ft: AVD*,

, 2007

B&boX j. sfessfdMs
Attorney for Defendant
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I personally mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing on this / /

day of

Af/m,)t£H ~

Mail, postage prepaid to the following:
Salt Lake District Attorney
Attention: Kent Morgan
111 E Broadway Ste 400
SALT LAKE CITY, Utah 84111
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2007, by first-class, U.S.

EXHIBIT B
Competency Evaluation update by state hospital Dr. Spencer.
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FORENSIC

0002/008

Department of Human Services
LESA-MICHELB CHURCH
EntCtith* Director

Division of Substaace Abuse and Mental Health
MARKL PAYNE
Director
JON M- HUNTSMAN. JK
Governor
GARYR, HERBERT
Lieutenant Governor

Utah State Hospital
DALLAS L. EARNSHAW
Superintendent

May 24,2007

The Honorable Gary D. Stott
Judge of the Fourth Judicial District Court
125 North 100 West
Provor Utah 84601
Re:
Ernest John Young (aka Jason Piesley)
Case#: 061402072
Dear Judge:
In accordance with Utah Code 77-15-6,1 have reviewed the data in the attached report by Robert F. Sawicki, Ph.D,*
Based on this informafion, I certily that Ernest John Young is now Competent to stand trial. Should you require
further information or testimony* the examiner would be the most knowledgeable source.
Sincerely,

t/~Richard B. Spencer. MD
Clinical Director
Utah State Hospital
Qualified examiners are appointed to perform these competency assessments. My involvement does not indude any
personal contact with the defendant Therefore, my testimony in court may be of limited value. The findings and
recommendations are those of the examining psychologist My role is to provide an administrative review to assure statutory
elements are addressed and that the conclusions and recommendations are supported by the findings.

1300 East Center Streete Provo, Utah 84603-02701 Telephone (801) 344-4400 e F*x (801) 34M225 a www.uskwah^av

EXHIBIT C
Statement Of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea and Certificate of
Counsel.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT IN
SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA AND
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

Plaintiff,
-vs-

Case No. 061402072
ERNEST JOHN YOUNG,
aka: Jason Presley
Defendant.

Judge Gary D. Stott

I, ERNEST JOHN YOUNG, hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been advised of
and that I understand the following facts and rights:
NOTIFICATION OF CHARGES
I am pleading guilty (or no contest) to the following crimes:
Crime & Statutory
Provision

Degree

Influencing, Impeding, or Retaliating
Against a Judge UCA §76-8-316

F3

1

Punishment
Min/Max and/or
Minimum Mandatory
0-5 years in prison $5000 fine
plus 85% surcharge $25 security
fee

• Enhanceable Second Offense, (Only if checked.)
I know and understand that if I am convicted in the future of this same crime, the second
conviction will be a [Class
Misdemeanor/
Degree Felony]. The maximum penalty for
that crime is
.
I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have read it, or had it
read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime(s) to which I am pleading
guilty (or no contest).
The elements of the crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest) are:
A.

ERNEST JOHN YOUNG, on or about May 5, 2006, in Salt Lake County, Utah, did
threaten to assault, kidnap, or murder a judge with the intent to impede, intimidate, or
interfere with the judge while engaged in the performance of the judge's official duties or
with the intent to retaliate against the judge on account of the performance of those
official duties.
I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes listed

above. (Or, if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed the foregoing
crimes). I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do not dispute or contest) that the
following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally
liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty (or no contest) pleas and
prove the elements of the crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest):
On May 5, 2006, in Salt Lake City, Utah, Ernest John Young made several phone calls to
Judge Hansen of the Third District Court, and threatened to execute him if he did not accept Mr.
Young's Petition to Seek the Death Penalty and Law Suit,

2

WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights under
the constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I plead guilty (or no
contest) I will give up all the following rights:
Counsel. I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I cannot
afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand that I might
later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed lawyer's
service to me. I have not waived my right to counsel. My attorney is David A. Stewart. My
attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of my guilty
(no contest) plea.
Jury Trial I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty (no contest).
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury
trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testify against me and b) my
attorney would have the opportunity to cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against
me.
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury trial, I could call
witnesses if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and
testimony of those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State
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would pay those costs.
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to have a
jury trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I chose not to
testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself. I also know that
if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my refusal to testify
against me.
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead guilty (or
no contest), I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the charged crime.
If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty," and my case will be set
for trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each element of the charge beyond
a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous, meaning that each
juror would have to find me guilty.
I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumption of innocence
and will be admitting that I committed the crime stated above.
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or judge, I
would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the cost of an
appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up my right to
appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest).
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the
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statutory and constitutional rights as explained above.
CONSEQUENCES OF ENTERING A GUILTY (OR NO CONTEST) PLEA
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each crime
to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know that by pleading guilty (or no contest) to a
crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving a mandatory penalty
for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, or both.
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be imposed.
I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes, including
any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of a plea agreement.
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime
involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run at the
same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each crime that I
plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing on another
offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty (or no contest), my guilty (or
no contest) plea now may result in consecutive sentences being imposed on me. If the offense to
which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was imprisoned or on parole, I know the law
requires the court to impose consecutive sentences unless the court finds and states on the record
that consecutive sentences would be inappropriate.
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Plea agreement. My guilty (or no contest) plea is the result of a plea bargain between
myself and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and provisions of the plea bargain,
if any, are fully contained in this statement, including those explained below:
I will plead to Count 1 as charged. The State will dismiss Count 2. The State is not
opposed to a 402 reduction of Count 1 to a Class A misdemeanor so long as I successfully
,
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e c
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C # 5
Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentence concession or
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for
sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding
on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they believe the judge
may do are not binding on the judge.
DEFENDANT'S CERTIFICATION OF VOLUNTARINESS
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, or unlawful
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest). No promises
except those contained in this statement have been made to me.
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I understand its
contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to change or delete
anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes because all of the
statements are correct.
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney.
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I am ^SO years of age. I have attended school through

^

-grade. I can read and

understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been provided
to me. I was not under the influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which would impair
my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under the influence of any drug,
medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment.
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing or
from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea.

I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I must file
a written motion to withdraw my plea(s) before sentence is announced, I understand that
for a plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw from the plea agreement must be made
within 30 days of pleading guilty or no contest. I will only be allowed to withdraw my plea
if I show that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made, I understand that any challenge
to my plea(s) made after sentencing must be pursued under the Post-Conviction Remedies
Act in Title 78, Chapter 35a, and Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Dated this (H**day of

^>*J*A-~

, 2007

ERNEST JOHN YJ3U
DEFENDANT

7

CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY
I certify that I am the attorney for ERNEST JOHN YOUNG, the defendant above, and
that I know he has read the statement or that I have read it to him; I have discussed it with him
and believe that he fully understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically
competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate investigation, the
elements of the crime and factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly
stated; and these, along with the other representations and declarations made by the defendant in
the foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true.

ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
Bar No.
/goST*

CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against ERNEST JOHN
YOUNG, defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of Defendant and find that the factual basis
of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the offense is true and correct. No
improper inducements, threats, or coercion to encourage a plea has been offered defendant. The
plea negotiations are fully contained in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as
supplemented on the record before the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the
evidence would support the conviction of defendant for the offense for which the plea is entered
and that the acceptance of the plea would serve the public interest,
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ORDER
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses the
signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea is freely, knowingly, and
voluntarily made.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea to the crime
set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered.

Dated this [T
:T

day of
of

__^\(jM^i
AllM^

,2007.

BY THE QOURT:

I
S7J$AM
District Court Judge
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